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Abstract
This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one
cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general the-
orem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though
less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.
Introduction
Hume’s Law is a name for the informal philosophical thesis that one “can’t get
an ought from an is” or, less snappily, that purely descriptive premises never
entail normative conclusions. It takes its name from a well-known passage in
the Treatise:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordi-
nary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am sur-
priz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions,
is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected
with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but
is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought
not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’tis necessary that it
shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a rea-
son should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how
this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it. (Hume, 1739, 3.1.1)
∗I am grateful to the following for helpful discussion of this material: Eduardo Barrio,
Lorenzo Boccafogli, Elke Brendel, Colin Caret, Aaron Cotnoir, Bogdan Dicher, Filippo Ferrari,
Ulf Hlobil, Lloyd Humberstone, Hannes Leitgeb, Ben Martin, Sebastiano Morruzi, Charles
Pigden, Stephen Read, Greg Restall, Lucas Rosenblatt, Gil Sagi, Kevin Scharp, Erik Stei,
Sara Uckelman, Peter Verdee, Timothy Williamson, and Dan Zeman.
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Hume’s Law is controversial, both in logic and in metaethics,1 but it is just
one example of the more general phenomenon of barriers to entailment—theses
according to which premises of one kind never entail conclusions of another.
Four others of interest to philosophers are: that one cannot deduce universal
conclusions from particular premises (see e.g. Russell (1918), p.100), that one
cannot deduce conclusions about the future from premises about the present
or the past (Hume, 1748, 4.21/37), that one cannot deduce conclusions about
how the world must be from premises which merely say how it is (Routley
and Routley, 1969; Humberstone, 1982), and finally that one cannot deduce
indexical claims from premises which are not themselves indexical (Castañeda
(1968); Lewis (1979); Russell (2012)). These other barrier theses are much less
controversial and often function as philosophical platitudes.
The present paper proves a Limited General Barrier Theorem from which a
precisification of each of the barriers follows. The goal is to provide a unified,
logical account of these barriers, permitting the platitudinous status of the less
controversial ones to support Hume’s Law. The theorem is “limited” in that it
says that the barriers hold unless a certain condition is met.
The paper has five main parts. Section 1 uses a counterexample to Hume’s
law proposed by Mavrodes (1964) to motivate and formulate the barrier’s limit.
Section 2 proves the limited indexical barrier, first introducing an indexical
logic to permit this to be done precisely. This is then generalised to the General
Limited Barrier in section 3, and it is shown how to derive the other four barriers
from the general one, employing a suitable logic in each case. Section 4 looks
at the consequences for some formal counterexamples to Hume’s Law found in
the literature, including those of Prior (1960) and Mavrodes (1964), and finally
in section 5 the approach presented here is compared to three extant proofs
of Hume’s Law, those of Schurz (1991, 1997), Pigden (1989), and Restall and
Russell (2010).
1 Motivating the Limited Barriers
1.1 Ought implies Can
We motivate the formulation of our barrier theorem via a proposed counterex-
ample to Hume’s Law. Mavrodes presented the issue succinctly in Analysis:
Many ethical philosophers appear to accept the view that ‘ought’
implies ‘can’. This view, which seems quite plausible, can perhaps
be formulated more precisely as (1) Statements of the form ‘N ought
1Some form of the law has been endorsed or defended by Hume (1739), Popper (1948), Prior
(1949), Hare (1952), Nowell-Smith (1954), Anscombe (1958a), Shorter (1961), Thomson and
Thomson (1964), Flew (1964), Jackson (1971), Jaggar (1974), von Kutschera (1977), Karmo
(1988), Pigden (1989), Schurz (1991, 1997), Guevera (2008), Singer (2015), and Fine (2021),
but it has been rejected in some form by Rynin (1957), Foot (1958), Anscombe (1958b),
Prior (1960), Black (1964), Searle (1964), Mavrodes (1964), Kurtzman (1970), Geach (1976),
MacIntyre (1981), Nelson (1995, 2007), Maitzen (1998, 2010) and Notter (2021).
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to do X’ entail the corresponding statements of the form ‘N can (is
able to) do X.’ But (1) is equivalent to (2) Statements of the form ‘N
cannot (is unable to) do X’ entail the corresponding statements of the
form ‘It is not the case that N ought to do X’. And (2) appears to say
that there is a non-normative statement which entails a normative
one. (Mavrodes, 1964, 42)
We can present the issue more succinctly still. It is widely held that the following
is correct:
Oφ  ♦φ (DM1)
and that contraposing preserves validity, so that this is correct too:
¬♦φ  ¬Oφ (DM2)
(DM2) appears to have non-normative premises but a normative conclusion; it
thus threatens to be a counterexample to Hume’s Law.
A defender of the barrier has four possible responses. Option A is to say
that the argument is not really valid. This approach is taken by Pigden (1989),
where it is argued that only first-order validity is validity proper. We will have
more to say about the advantages of our approach over Pigden’s in section 5, but
for now we note that it seems unlikely that the sense of entailment employed in
the highly intuitive barrier theses is so restrictive that say, Oφ  Pφ and p  ♦p
cannot count as valid. Option B is to hold that that the conclusion of (DM2)
is not really normative. We can generate some plausibility for this option by
looking at two of the other barriers to entailment—it’s quite plausible that the
negation of a universal statement, e.g. ¬∀xFx, which is equivalent to ∃x¬Fx,
is not universal and that ¬p, which is equivalent to ♦¬p is not a must-type (or
modally universal) claim. But the attractiveness of option B evaporates once we
recognise that ought implies can and its contrapositive are just two of a larger
number of interrelated deontic modal principles that seem likely to stand or fall
together. Substituting ¬φ for φ in (DM2) and taking the deontic and modal
operators to be interdefined in the standard ways, gives us:
φ  Pφ (DM3)
Contraposing gives:
¬Pφ  ¬φ (DM4)
Moreover the same kind of reasoning that gives us Ought implies Can suggests
Pφ  ♦φ (DM5)
And similar moves give:
¬♦φ  ¬Pφ (DM6)
φ  Oφ (DM7)
¬Oφ  ¬φ (DM8)
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Of these eight DM principles, four (DM 2, 3, 6 and 7) have apparently non-
normative premises and normative conclusions, and two of those four (3 and 7)
do not contain negation. Thus, even if correct, the suggestion that the class of
normative sentences is not closed under negation would not solve the problem
in full generality; we would still need to contend with counterexamples like
p  Pp.
There are two options remaining. Option C is to hold that the premises of
(DM2) are not really non-normative. This would require some explanation to
avoid ad hocery. Finally Option D is to back off the barrier in its full strength
and instead adopt a limited version, according to which non-normative premises
never entail normative conclusions unless some further condition is met. This
would require the formulation and justification of the further condition. One
approach of this kind is that taken in Schurz (1991, 1997, 2010b). We will
compare the present approach with Schurz’ in more detail in section 5. Over the
remainder of section 1 we argue that in choosing to limit the barrier in response
to the argument from Ought Implies Can Schurz was entirely correct: (DM2)
represents a special case in which the normal reason to think that descriptive
premises never entail normative conclusions fails.
1.2 Will implies Can
Given that the goal is a unified account of the barriers, we can ask whether
similar problems arise for the other barriers, and what it would be sensible to
say about those. With the past/future barrier we might consider Will implies
Can: that something will be the case entails that it is possible.2 In the language
of tense-modal logic:3
Fφ  ♦φ (TM1)
Contraposing gives
¬♦φ  ¬Fφ (TM2)
(TM2)’s premise is not about the future, while the conclusion is, giving us
a putative counterexample. As with the (DM) principles from the previous
section, these two belong to a larger group:
2Not every reading of possible supports this principle. English contains both absolute and
time-relative conceptions of possible and necessary. The time-relative sense allows us to say
“You should take chemistry this year, so that it is possible for you get into med school in
your final year” and the absolute sense gives us things like “There will be no FTL-travel in
the future because FTL-travel is impossible.” We are interested in counterexamples to the
past/future barrier, so here we will assume the absolute sense, which supports (TM1).
3Here F and G are Prior’s unary tense operators, translating roughly as at some future
time it is the case that and at all future times it is the case that respectively. Later we will
also use P and H meaning at some time in the past it is the case that and at all times in the
past it is the case that respectively.
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φ  Fφ (TM3)
¬Fφ  ¬φ (TM4)
Fφ  ♦φ (TM5)
¬♦φ  ¬Fφ (TM6)
φ  Gφ (TM7)
¬Gφ  ¬φ4 (TM8)
TM 2, 3, 6 and 7 have future claims on the right but not on the left.
Again, there are four possible responses: A: deny the entailment, but this
is hard to justify, given the intuitive sense of consequence in play in barriers to
entailment. B: deny that the conclusions are really Future, but this is implau-
sible for Fp and Gp especially. C: hold that modal claims like p and ♦p are
somehow really Future after all, or D: restrict the barrier so that it does not
forbid such arguments.
1.3 ‘Everyone’ includes me
We also get similar issues for the indexical barrier, according to which sentences
which contain indexicals are not entailed by non-indexical sentences. Consider
the interaction between quantifiers like ∀ and ∃, and the first-person pronoun ı.
ı refers to whoever the agent of the context of utterance is, and since this must
be an element of the domain of the model, whenever I am R is true, something
is R is true as well, making the entailment from I am R to Something is R true.
In the formal language of LD—(Kaplan, 1989)’s Logic of Demonstratives—this
would be:
Rı  ∃xRx (IL1)
Contraposing gives
¬∃xRx  ¬Rı (IL2)
Substituting ¬R for R in (IL2), and treating the quantifiers as interdefined in
the usual way gives us:
∀xRx  Rı (IL3)
And contraposing once again:
¬Rı  ¬∀xRx (IL4)
IL 2 and 3 have indexicals in the conclusion, but not the premises, making them
putative counterexamples. We have the usual four options, but here, I think,
4We might also include some stronger principles, e.g., (TM9) Pφ ∨ p ∨ Fφ S ♦φ.
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it is much clearer what the right one is. Option A: say that the arguments
are not really valid; this is even more implausible here than in the previous
cases. Option B: say that Rı is not really indexical, but it is surely indexical
if any sentence is. Option C: say that ∀xRx is really indexical. But though
quantifiers can be context-sensitive—quantifying over different subsets of the
domain relative to different contexts of utterance—the quantifiers in the formal
language of (LD) are not. In this case Option D, limiting the articulation of
the barrier so that it is no longer in conflict with such cases, is the only sensible
option. But how do we do that?
1.4 Formulating the Limit
It can help to consider why anyone expects there to be an indexical barrier in
the first place. The existence of a barrier is suggested by work in the philosophy
of language by Castañeda, Perry, and Lewis.5 Lewis asks us to imagine there are
two gods, one who lives on the tallest mountain and one who lives on the coldest.
One is angry and hurls thunderbolts on the people below, the other generous
and showers mana. Each is omniscient in a distinctive way: they know which
non-indexical sentences are true.6 For example, they each know the truth-value
of The generous god lives on the tallest mountain, there are two gods, and one
god throws thunderbolts. The question is: can either deduce the truth-values of
any indexical sentences?
Lewis’ remarks suggest not.7 Moreover, there are general theoretical reasons
to think this, namely: the truth-values of indexical sentences vary with who the
god is (and more generally with the context); I am the angry god is true for
one god, false for the other. The coldest mountain is here is false in one god’s
context but true in the other’s. If either indexical sentence followed from the
non-indexical premises available to both gods, it would be a logical consequence
of true premises, and so true itself—no matter what the context was. So neither
can be entailed by the premises.
The forgoing suggests a non-syntactic way of defining indexical sentences
(something that will be important for formulating the barrier) and an argument
for the barrier’s existence. First, call a sentence indexical if we can change
its truth-value by changing the context of utterance. When we look at the
model theory for a logic like LD—in which a context is a quadruple of agent,
5Castañeda (1968) draws attention to the failure of entailment in limited contexts, Perry
(1979) and Perry (1977) give us the Messy Shopper and Amnesiac in the Library thought
experiments that motivate the so-called essentiality of the indexical, and Lewis (1979) is the
source of the Two Gods thought experiment articulated here.
6The world indexical is more commonly applied to subsentential expressions like I, here,
tomorrow etc, which are indexical just in case their propositional content varies with context.
But given that that the propositional content of a sentence (a proposition) is composed of the
contents of the expressions of which it is composed, sentences containing indexicals will them-
selves have contents which vary with context (they express different propositions in different
contexts.) In virtue of this we can refer to sentences as indexical as well.
7This is complicated by the fact that his set up of the case is slightly different from mine.
But on page 521 he writes: “[n]either one knows whether he lives on the tallest mountain or
on the coldest mountain, nor whether he throws manna or thunderbolts.” (bold added.)
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place, time and world, 〈a, p, t, w〉, relative to which sentences get truth-values—
this will give us a partition of the set of sentences. We could then argue that
indexical sentences never follow from non-indexical premises by noting that
if such non-indexical premises are true in a model, changing the context can
falsify an indexical conclusion without falsifying the premises, which generates
a counterexample.
That’s the reason to think the barrier will exist. But now consider (IL3):
∀xRx  Fı, which constitutes a problem for the very reasoning just sketched.
Suppose the gods knows that the non-indexical sentence All gods live on moun-
tains is true. Then each can deduce If I am a god, I live on a mountain. This is
a counterexample to the barrier, and a case in which the reasoning of the previ-
ous paragraph fails. For suppose the premises are such that, in order for them
to be true in a model, that model must be such that every available context is
one in which the conclusion is true. Then even though the conclusion is sensitive
to context in general, when we look only at models which make the premises
true, only contexts which make the indexical sentence true remain available.
Fortunately, this problem suggests a way to formulate the limit: Γ 2 φ unless
every context-shift of every model of Γ is a model of φ. Now it is time to make
these ideas more precise.
2 The Limited Indexical Barrier
For thinking carefully about entailment relations on languages which contain
indexicals, we turn to the model theory for indexical logics.8
2.1 Indexical Logic
The logic below, IL (for indexical logic), is a simplified version of Kaplan (1989)’s
logic, LD.
2.1.1 The Language
Our language has two sorts of term, i-terms (intended to denote elements from
the domain of individuals) and p-terms (for elements from a second domain, the
domain of places.) i-terms are divided into i-constants (a, b, c etc.), i-variables
(x, y, z, etc.) and a logical i-term: ı (for the first person pronoun, I ) and p-
terms are similarly divided: p, p0, p1 . . . etc. are p-constants, v, v0, v1 . . . etc. are
p-variables, and h (for the indexical here) is a logical p-term.
The arity of predicates is given by a pair, 〈m,n〉, with m the number of i-
terms and n the number of p-terms needed to form an atomic wff. We have non-
logical predicate-letters Q〈m,n〉, R〈m,n〉, S〈m,n〉 etc.,9 and two logical identity
8The treatment of indexical logic here is rather brief. Additional motivation and back-
ground can be found in Kaplan (1989) and Russell (2011).
9We avoid using P,H, F , and G as predicate-letters since these will be our tense operators.
In the interests of readability, we drop the superscript giving the predicate’s arity where this
is obvious.
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predicates, =〈2,0〉 and =〈0,2〉 (the former a relation between each individual and
itself, the later a relation between each place and itself). We also inherit from
LD the special predicate Loc〈1,1〉 (for is located at.)
Logical constants are the usual truth-functors ¬,∧,∨,→, and ↔, first-order
quantifiers ∀, and ∃, (which may bind either i or p-variables), modal operators
, and ♦, tense operators F , G, P , H, (as explained in note 3) and the context-
sensitive unary sentence-operators, A, and N (for actually and now.)
2.1.2 Models
An IL-model is an 6-tuple,
〈W,T,D, P,C, I〉
in which:
1. W is a non-empty set of points (worlds)
2. T is the set of integers (times)
3. D is a non-empty set (domain of individuals)
4. P is a non-empty set (domain of places)
5. C is a quadruple, (the model’s context)
〈a, p, n,@〉
where:
(a) a ∈ D (the agent of the context)
(b) p ∈ P (the place of the context)
(c) n ∈ T (the time of the context, now)
(d) @ ∈W (the world of the context, the actual world)
6. I is a function from expressions, to an appropriate value for that expression
as follows:
(a) If t is a non-logical i-constant, then I(t) ∈ D
(b) If t is a non-logical p-constant, then I(t) ∈ P
(c) If Π is an 〈m,n〉-place non-logical predicate, then I(Π) is a function
such that for each t ∈ T and w ∈ W , IΠ(t, w) ⊆ (Dm × Pn) (i.e.
a function from time-world pairs to an sequence consisting of an m-
tuple of individuals from D followed by an n-tuple of places from
P—the predicate’s intension.)
7. (a, p) ∈ ILoc(n,@)
2.1.3 Truth and Denotation
Variable assignments need to accommodate both i-variables and p-variables. Let
fi be a function from each of the i-variables to a value in D, and fp a function
from each of the p-variables to a value in P . Then fi∪fp is variable assignment.
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We write [α]Mgtw for the denotation of the term α in the model M, on the
assignment g, at the time t in the world w.
[α]Mgtw =

I(α) if α is a non-logical i-constant or p-constant
g(α) if α is an i-variable or p-variable
a if α is ı (ı refers to the model’s agent)
p if α is h (h refers to the model’s place)
We write VMg (φ, t, w) for the truth-value of the wff φ at a time t and world w,
in the model M on the variable assignment g.
1. If i1, . . . , im are i-terms, p1, . . . , pn p-terms, and Π an 〈m,n〉-
place non-logical predicate, then VMg (Πi1 . . . imp1 . . . pn, w, t) = 1 iff
([i1]Mgtw, . . . , [im]Mgtw, [p1]Mgtw, . . . , [pn]Mgtw) ∈ IΠ(t, w)
2. If α and β are terms, then VMg (α = β, t, w) = 1 iff [α]Mgtw = [β]Mgtw
3. The truth-conditions for the truth-functors are as you might expect, e.g.:
VMg (φ→ ψ,w, t) = 1 iff VMg (φ,w, t) = 0 or VMg (ψ,w, t) = 1
4. Quantifiers range over the sets D or P in the model, depending on whether
they bind i or p variables, e.g.:





(φ,w, t) = 1





(φ,w, t) = 1
5. Tense operators have the expected clauses, e.g.: VMg (Fφ, t, w) = 1 iff
there is u ∈ T, t < u and VMg (φ, u,w) = 1
6. To avoid unneeded complexity, modal operators are unrestricted by an
accessibility relation, e.g.: VMg (♦φ, t, w) = 1 iff there is v ∈ W such that
VMg (φ, t, v) = 1
7. Finally, we have clauses for the context-sensitive operators. Each makes
reference to a member of the model’s context (n and @ respectively.)
(a) VMg (Nφ, t, w) = 1 iff VMg (φ, n,w) = 1
(b) VMg (Aφ, t, w) = 1 iff VMg (φ, t,@) = 1
2.1.4 Truth and Consequence
Truth at a time in a world in a model:
VM (φ, t, w) = 1 iff VMg (φ, t, w) = 1 for all assignments g.
Truth in a model:
φ is true in a model M iff VM (φ, n,@) = 1.
We write VM (φ) = 1 for this and abbreviate VM (φ) = 1 for all φ ∈ Γ to
VM (Γ) = 1.
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Logical Consequence:
Γ IL φ iff for all models M, if VM (Γ) = 1, then VM (φ) = 1
2.2 Context-shifts and Taxonomy
Now that we have our indexical logic, the next step is to define a relation of
context-shifting (./) on the IL-models. We will say that one model is a context
shift of another if they are alike except perhaps for the a (agent) or p (place)
elements in the context C. More formally:
Definition (Context-Shift (./)). A model N = 〈WN , TN , DN , PN , CN , IN 〉,
where CN = 〈aN , pN , nN ,@N 〉, is a context-shift of a model M =
〈WM , TM , DM , PM , CM , IM 〉, where CM = 〈aM , pM , nM ,@M 〉 just in case
WM = WN , TM = TN , DM = DN , PM = PN , nM = nN , @M = @N , and
IM = IN . (That is, M ./ N just case the models differ at most on a and p.)
We use ./ in our definition of indexical sentences.
Definition (Indexical Sentence). A sentence φ is indexical iff there are models,
M,N , such that M satisfies φ, N ./ M , and N does not satisfy φ.10
We will also call such sentences context-shift breakable.
Theorem 1 (Limited Indexical Barrier). If Γ is a non-indexical set of sentences
and φ is indexical, then Γ 2 φ—unless every model M of Γ is such that every
context-shift of M is a model of φ.
Proof. Suppose the barrier’s unless-clause is not met, i.e. that some model M
of Γ is such that there is a model N , M ./ N and φ is false in N . Since M
satisfies Γ and M ./ N , the new model N satisfies Γ (Γ is non-indexical and so
not breakable by context-switches.) Thus N is a counterexample and Γ 2 φ.
Remark. Indexical sentences include: Rı, ¬Rı, Rı∧Sh, Ra∨R1ı, Ra→ R1ı,
Rı, GSh.
Suppose Rı is true in a model M where I(R,n,@) ( D. Then the model N
which is just like M except that aN ∈ D− I(R,n,@), is such that M ./ N and
VN (Rı) = 0. Hence it is ./-breakable: indexical. ¬Rı is indexical for similar
reasons (since ./ is symmetric, just reverse M and N in the story above.)
More generally, the set of indexical sentences is closed under negation. For
suppose φ is indexical. Then there are M , N such that VM (φ) = 1, M ./ N ,
and VN (φ) = 0. But then VN (¬φ) = 1 and again by symmetry N ./ M , and
since VM (φ) = 1, VM (¬φ) = 0. Hence ¬φ is ./-breakable: indexical.
10Similarly: a set of sentences is indexical iff there is a model which satisfies that set, and
a context shift of that model which does not. Below we assume all similar model theoretic
definitions of sentence properties are extended to sets in this way.
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We will see later that the status of the disjunctions and conditionals above
is especially salient given the counterexamples that have been proposed against
Hume’s Law. Some formulations classify disjunctions of descriptive sentences
with normative sentences as neither normative nor descriptive, and state only
that normative sentences don’t follow from descriptive premises—thus saying
nothing about such disjunctions. Schurz (1997, 11-12) and Vranas (2010) have
stressed the importance of classifying these mixed disjunctions and conditionals
as normative, and for now we note only that identifying indexicality with ./-
breakability allows us to do the analogous thing in the case of the indexical
barrier.
Remark. Sentences which are not indexical include: Ra, ∀xRx, Ra, Ra ∨
¬Ra, Ra ∧ ¬Ra, NLoc(ı, h), Rı ∧ ¬Rı, AFa, NFa.
No logical truths are indexical. They are not ./-breakable because there is no
model which makes them false. This means that the famous sentence NLoc(ı, h)
(informally: I am here now) which is a logical truth in Kaplan’s and our systems,
counts as non-indexical.
Similarly, no unsatisfiable sentence is indexical, because there is no model
which makes it true. For example, Rı ∧ ¬Rı is non-indexical. From the above
it is clear that merely containing an indexical expression is not sufficient for
indexicality in the sense in use in the barrier. Rather, the property we are
interested in is a model theoretic one: having a truth value that is vulnerable
to certain kinds of change in the model.11
11More surprisingly, some simple sentences containing N and A—like NRa and ARa—are
not indexical in the sense defined, since context-shifting changes only a and p—not n and
@. This is intentional, but the reasons for it are a bit complicated. First, note that if we
were to count sentences like AFa and NFa as indexical, they would present straightforward
counterexamples to the claim that one cannot get indexical sentences from non, since Fa 
AFa and Fa  NFa. That is because there is a critical difference between a and p on the
one hand, and n and @ on the other: n and @ are not only part of the context of use for
the sentence, but also part of the circumstance of evaluation for the proposition expressed
by the sentence. The time and world parameters play a double role, first to determine which
proposition the sentence expresses, and second to determine whether or not that proposition
is true. That matters because context-shifts are supposed to be mere context-shifts, which
keep everything else the same. If we allowed n and @ to shift as well, that would automatically
shift the n and @ with respect to which the proposition is evaluated, in addition to shifting the
context, with the consequence that sentences which always express the same contingent (or
temporally contingent) proposition—like Ra—would all be counted as indexical. Admittedly,
some authors do allow the expression indexical to be used that broadly sometimes (e.g., Lewis
(1980, 24–35) “Contingency is a kind of indexicality”) but I don’t think that broad conception
is the one employed in the intuitive version of the indexical barrier; the two gods are allowed
to know the truth-values of contingent and temporary premises and they can infer Aφ and
Nφ for any φ they know to be true. A final remark on generalising this to non-Kaplanian
conceptions of propositions: if we had a different conception of proposition, perhaps one on
which the truth-value varied only with the world parameter, or even one on which it varied
with world, time and place, this would affect which aspects of the context could be changed
with context: the underlying idea is that you can shift all aspects of the context of use that
are not also featured in the circumstances of evaluation. See (Russell, 2011, 155—157) for
more on this topic.
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Remark. ∀xRx  Rı meets the barrier’s unless clause, so that (IL3) is not a
counterexample.
∀xRx is non-indexical; changing a and p in C will not change the fact that
I(R,n,@) = D and so will not change the universal sentence from true to false.
Rı is indexical; changing a in C can change the truth-value of Rı in models
where I(R,n,@) 6= D. Moreover (IL3) is valid in IL. But any model of ∀xRx is
one where I(R,n,@) = D, and no context-shift of such a model is one in which
Fı is false.
Next we want to generalise our insights from the indexical case to the other
barriers.
3 The Limited General Barrier
In this section we generalise the Limited Indexical Barrier to a statement from
which each of the five barriers follows. Suppose we have a logic, L, where this
is to say that we have
i) a formal language,
ii) a set of models, U , with respect to which sentences in the formal language
are true or false, and
iii) a definition of consequence, i.e. Γ L φ just in case all models of Γ are
models of φ.
And suppose R is a binary relation on U . (In the indexical case, the logic was
IL and R was context-shifting.)
Definition (R-breakable). A sentence φ is R-breakable just in case there is a
pair of models M,N ∈ U such that VM (φ) = 1, MRN , and VN (φ) = 0.
Where a sentence is not R-breakable, we call it R-preserved.
Theorem 2 (The Limited General Barrier). If Γ is R-preserved and φ is R-
breakable, then Γ 2 φ, unless all models of Γ are such that all R-related models
N are models of φ.
Proof. The proof mirrors that of the Limited Indexical Barrier. Suppose the
unless-condition is not met. Then there is some model of Γ, M , and a model
N where MRN and N is not a model of φ. Then N is also a model of Γ
true because MRN and Γ is R-preserved. But φ is false in N , making N a
counterexample, so Γ 2 φ as required.
3.1 Four More Barriers
For each remaining barrier we require a logic and a suitable R-relation. The
next four subsections identify these for the other four barriers, culminating in
Hume’s Law.
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Universal sentences and Domain Extension
Universal sentences are vulnerable to expansions of the domain of the model:
whenever ∀xFx is true in a model, for example, it can be made false by ex-
panding the domain to include a new element which is “¬F .” So let U be the
set of first-order models (pairs 〈D, I〉, where D is a non-empty set and I an
interpretation function.) R will be the relation of Domain Extension on that
set of models.
Definition (Domain Extension). A model N, 〈DN , IN 〉, is a D-extension of a
model M , 〈DM , IM 〉 iff
1. DM ⊆ DN
2. for all individual constants, α, IN (α) = IM (α)
3. for all n-place predicate letters, Π, and all di ∈ DM ,
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ IN (Π) iff 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ IM (Π).
So N may contain new elements that are not in M , but when restricted to the
domain of M , IN yields the same values as it did on M .
Definition (Universal Sentence). A sentence φ is universal just in case there
are first-order models M,N such that N is a D-extension of M , VM (φ) = 1 and
VN (φ) = 0, i.e. the sentence is D-extension breakable.
Remark (This model-theoretic conception of a universal sentence is distinct
from the syntactic conception of a sentence that contains a ∀). ¬∃x¬Rx is
universal though it does not contain a universal quantifier, and the logical truth
∀x(Rx → Rx) is not universal even though it does, since—being true in all
models—it is not D-extension breakable.
Remark (The set of universal sentences is not closed under negation. (Nor
is the set of non-universal sentences)). ∀xRx is universal but ¬∀xRx is not.
p∨∀xRx is universal but ¬(p∨∀xRx) is not. (Similarly, ∃xRx is non-universal
but ¬∃xRx is universal.)
The contrast between the universal and indexical barriers when it comes to
closure under negation is explained by the properties of the R-relation used in
their definitions: context-shifting is symmetric whereas domain-extension is not.
Proposition 1. If R is symmetric, then the set of R-breakable sentences is
closed under negation.
Proof. Suppose R is symmetric and let φ be an R-breakable sentence. Then
there are models M,N , such that MRN , VM (φ) = 1 and VN (φ) = 0. But then
VN (¬φ) = 1 and since R is symmetric, NRM . And since VM (¬φ) = 0, ¬φ is
R-breakable too.
Corollary (Limited Universal Barrier). If Γ is non-universal and φ is universal,
then Γ 2 φ unless all D-extensions of all models of Γ are also models of φ.
Proof. This follows from the Limited General Barrier.
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Modally Universal sentences and W -extension
An informal way to gloss the modal barrier is as saying that you can’t get
sentences which say how things must be from premises which merely tell you
how things are. Intuitively that is because sentences which say how things must
be place requirements global requirements on the set of possibilities, whereas
sentences which tell us how things are are only concerned with what is happening
locally—in the actual world. Adding new possibilities can “break” sentences of
the former kind, but not sentences of the later. This section precisifies this
informal conception of the barrier.
We will look at 3 different modal logics: S4, B, and S5, as the variation
illustrates the robustness of the Limited General Barrier: changing the logic
sometimes changes the taxonomy, but the barrier continues to hold. B is es-
pecially important in the context of the modal barrier because the entailment
version of the B-axiom might be thought to be a counterexample (Routley and
Routley, 1969; Humberstone, 1982):
p  ♦p (B)
The Logics
In this case our language consists of sentence letters and truth-functors, sup-
plemented with  and ♦. Models are 4-tuples 〈W,S,@, I〉 with @ ∈ W and
S a reflexive accessibility relation on W . For S4, B and S5 we restrict at-
tention to models in which S is transitive, symmetric, or both transitive and
symmetric, respectively. That is, the set U of models in the definition, below,
of W -extension, pertinent to one of these logics should be taken to comprise all
models whose accessibility relations have the properties just spelled out for the
logic in question. A sentence of the formal language is true in a model if it is
true at the model’s actual world, and Γ  φ just in case all models of Γ are
models of φ.
The Taxonomy
Our R-relation is that of W -extension:
Definition (W -Extension). For all models M,N ∈ U , N is a W -extension of
M just in case:
1. WM ⊆WN
2. for all u, v ∈WM , uSMv iff uSNv
3. @M = @N
4. for all sentence letters α, and w ∈WM ,
IM (α,w) = IN (α,w).
Informally: you get a W -extension of a model by adding to the worlds in W ,
extending the I-function to assign truth-values to the sentence letters at those
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worlds, and extending the accessibility relation S (where it touches new worlds)
if wished.
Definition (Modally Universal). A sentence is modally universal just in case
it is W -extension breakable.
Corollary (Limited Modal Barrier). If Γ is not modally universal and φ is
modally universal, then Γ 2 φ unless all W -extensions of all models of Γ are
also models of φ.
Proof. This follows from the Limited General Barrier.
Now we can ask about p  ♦p, which is valid in B and S5: if p is true at the
actual world of an arbitrary B or S5 model, then, thanks to symmetry, ♦p is
true at all accessible worlds and ♦p is true at the actual world, and so in the
model.
Moreover the premise p is not modally universal; if VM (p,@) = 1, adding
worlds to W will not change that. The conclusion ♦p is modally universal on
the B-models. Suppose we have a model in which W = {@, w}, the two worlds
are accessible from each other, and p is false at @, but true at w. Then ♦p is
true at @, since w is accessible from @, and true at w because of reflexivity.
So ♦p is true at @ and true in the model. But if we added a third world
v, accessible from @ but not from w, and made p false at v, then there are no
worlds accessible from v where p holds, and so ♦p is false there, and so now ♦p








V (♦p) = 0
Figure 1: ♦p is W -extension breakable on B-models.
However, in this case p  ♦p meets the barrier’s unless-clause: no B-model of
p (recall that a sentence is true in the model if it is true in the model’s actual
world) has a W -extension in which ♦p fails to be true at the actual world:
thanks to symmetry, the truth of p at the actual world makes ♦p true at all
worlds accessible from it.
Things are different with S5, because there ♦p is not W -extension break-
able. (The model on the right in figure 1 is not an S5-model.) We could add
a new world, accessible from the actual world, but if ♦p was true before, it
was because every world accessible from @ could access a world where p is true.
Thanks to the reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity of the accessibility relation,
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the worlds accessible from @ form an equivalence class. Either the new world
is inaccessible from any world in that class—in which case it will not affect the
truth-value of any sentence in the model—or it is, in which case it can access
at least one world where p is true, and so ♦p is true at the new world, so that
the truth of ♦p in the model is unaffected. So in S5 the B-argument is not a
counterexample because the conclusion is not modally universal; its truth can
be secured by the existence of a single world.
And of course in S4, the B-argument fails as a counterexample because it is
not valid.
One lesson from the above is that the Limited Barrier has a certain robust-
ness; it is not limited to the particular logics that we use to illustrate it. We
might reject one logic, and adopt another, by changing the set of models which
we quantify over in our definition of logical consequence. But this change also
changes the taxonomy of sentences: what counts as being e.g. modally universal
or indexical, in a way that preserves the barrier. The main danger in changing
our logics is not so much that the barrier will be false of the new logic, but
rather that the taxonomy might be implausible or futile in some way.
Before moving on we note that there is a different putative counterexample
to the modal barrier that would require a first-order modal logic for rigorous
treatment, namely:12
a = b  (a = b).
However we can see the important part of how the Barrier will treat the ar-
gument very easily: since modally universal claims are those which are W -
extension breakable, the conclusion (a = b) is not modally universal: if it is
true in a model it will be true in all extensions of that model.
Future-sentences and future-switching
Future sentences are, roughly, sentences whose truth-values can change if the
future changes. We will use a tense logic to make that idea more precise, and
because we are especially keen to resolve questions about p  Fp—given its
parallels with Mavrodes’ counterexample to Hume’s Law—it will be a tense-
modal logic (TML for short.)
The primitive expressions of our language are sentence letters, truth-
functors,  and ♦, and four unary tense logical operators: F , G, P , and H,
meaning at some time in the future, at all times in the future, at some time in




12This argument assumes that the individual constants a and b are rigid and that = is a
logical predicate. See Kripke (1980) (especially the preface) for more details. Not all modal
logics make these assumptions, but without them we have no counterexample to worry about.
There are also counterparts of this argument for the past/future barrier: a = b  F (a = b)
and a = b  G(a = b).
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1. W a non-empty set (worlds)
2. T the set of integers (times)
3. @ ∈W (the actual world)
4. n ∈ T (the now)
5. I assigns each sentence letter an intension: a function from T ×W into
{1, 0}.
In the interests of simplicity—to allow us to demonstrate the main points with-
out additional distraction—we forgo a modal accessibility relation (the operators
will be unrestricted)—and make use of the standard ordering on the integers as
our tense-logical “<” relation. In simple cases we can represent a model with a
table:
w @ u
t5 p, q p, q, r p
t4 p, q p, q p
n p, r p p
t2 p p p, q
t1 p, q p, q p, q
Figure 2: A table representing a TML model
The table in figure 2 displays the different worlds in W along the top, and the
times in T down the left-hand side. In each cell, 〈t, w〉 we write the sentence
letters which receive the value 1 from the I function relative to that time-world
pair. We adopt the convention of having time proceed from the bottom of the
table to the top, so that the past is at the bottom and the future at the top.
The sentence letters in the 〈n,@〉 cell are the sentences which are true now in
the actual world of the model.
Truth-functors receive their standard interpretations, and the clauses for the
tense-logical operators are as one might expect:
VM (Fφ, t, w) = 1 iff there is u ∈ T such that t < u and VM (φ, u,w) = 1
VM (Gφ, t, w) = 1 iff for all u ∈ T such that t < u, VM (φ, u,w) = 1
VM (Pφ, t, w) = 1 iff there is u ∈ T such that u < t and VM (φ, u,w) = 1
VM (Hφ, t, w) = 1 iff for all u ∈ T such that u < t, VM (φ, u,w) = 1
When it comes to the clauses for  and ♦ there is a choice.13 We could say
that p is true at a time and world just in case p is true at that time in all
13The choice is discussed in (Thomason, 1984, 137). Thomason makes a different choice
than we do here, but that’s because he explicitly requires a time-relative sense of possibility.
p  Fp requires a non-time-relative sense to be valid, so we take that interpretation instead.
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worlds. Or we could say that p is true at a time and a world just in case
p is true at all times in all worlds. The former allows a time-relative sense of
possibility and necessity; p could be true at t, w but not true at t1, w. The
latter is what we need here, in order to get a tense-modal logic that validates
our TML principles. p  Fp makes sense only on the assumption that the 
tells about future times as well as the present one. The clauses for our modal
operators will thus be:
VM (♦φ, t, w) = 1 iff there is u ∈W and t∗ ∈ T such that VM (φ, t∗, u) = 1
VM (φ, t, w) = 1 iff for all u ∈W and t∗ ∈ T , VM (φ, t∗, u) = 1
This makes p a strong claim: for it to be true at a world in a model, it must
be true at all pairs of times and worlds in the model, i.e. (where the model
can be represented with a table) in every cell of the table representing the model.
Truth in a model:
φ is true in a model M iff VM (φ, n,@) = 1
Truth in a model is truth at the model’s actual now. We write: VM (φ) = 1.
Logical consequence:
Γ TML φ iff for all TML-models M, if VM (Γ) = 1, then VM (φ) = 1.
This gives us a logic which validates each of the TM-principles from section 1.2.
For example:
Proposition 2. (TM3) φ  Fφ
Proof. Assume VM (φ) = 1. Then VM (φ, n,@) = 1 which requires that for
all w ∈ W and t ∈ T , VM (φ, t, w) = 1. In particular, for all t∗ ∈ T such that
n < t∗, VM (φ, t
∗,@) = 1. Hence VM (Gφ,@) = 1. So VM (Gφ) = 1.
Next we need an R relation on the models, to be used in defining Future sen-
tences. Above we suggested that this would be a precisification of ‘changing
the future’ i.e., a model would stand in the appropriate relation to another if
you could get it from the first by changing (only) the future. There are two
natural precisifications of this idea, which we’ll call unrestricted and restricted
future-switching.
Unrestricted future-switching
Call one model an unrestricted future-switch of another if you can get it from
the first by changing the values of the I-function for pairs 〈t,@〉 where n < t.
That is: changing which sentences letters appear in the “actual future”—cells
shaded grey in the tables in figure 3.
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w @ u
t5 p, q p, q, r p
t4 p, q p, q p
n p, r p p
t2 p p p, q
t1 p, q p, q p, q
w @ u
t5 p, q p
t4 p, q r p
n p, r p p
t2 p p p, q
t1 p, q p, q p, q
Figure 3: Unrestricted future-switching
In figure 3, the model on the right is an unrestricted future-switch of the model
on the left; it is just like the one on the left except for the sentence letters in
the grey box. Since future-switching is symmetric, the model on the left is also
an unrestricted future-switch of the model on the right.
Future sentences are sentences which are future-switch breakable. If future-
switching is unrestricted like this, we get a somewhat uncomfortable result: p
will count as Future, since it is true on the left but false on the right. An
alternative is to use restricted future-switching.
Restricted future-switching
Restricted future-switching involves swapping out the actual future for one
which—according to the model—is merely possible.
w @ u
t5 p, q p, q, r p
t4 p, q p, q p
n p, r p p
t2 p p p, q
t1 p, q p, q p, q
w @ u
t5 p, q p p, q, r
t4 p, q p p, q
n p, r p p
t2 p p p, q
t1 p, q p, q p, q
Figure 4: Restricted future-switching
In the illustration in figure 4, the model on the right is obtained from the one
on the left by “swapping” the future of world u for that of @. (And vice versa—
restricted future-switching is symmetric too.) If we use this relation to define
the Future sentences, then Fp and Gp come out Future, as expected (if Fp is
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true in a model where there are possible worlds where p is false in the future,
we can future-switch to make it false) but p and ♦p do not: if p or ♦p is
true in a model, restricted future-switching cannot break them.
This is both a more intuitive taxonomy for modal claims, and in line with
our aim of treating (IL3) and (TM3) in analogous ways. (Recall that we defined
indexical sentences so that ∀xFx did not count as indexical.) We will thus
proceed with restricted future-switching as our R-relation for the past/future
barrier. Here is a more formal definition:
Definition (Future-switching, g). For all TML-models M,N , N gM just in
case:
1. WM = WN
2. TM = TN
3. @M = @N
4. nM = nN
5. there is some u ∈WM such that for all t ∈ TM (nM < t), and all sentence
letters α,
IN (α, t, u) = IM (α, t,@) and IN (α, t,@) = IM (α, t, u)
whereas for t ≤ nM ,
IN (α, t, u) = IM (α, t, u) and IN (α, t,@) = IM (α, t,@)
6. for all w ∈W,w 6= u, w 6= @, and all t ∈ T,
IM (α, t, w) = IN (α, t, w)
Since the u mentioned in clause 5 could be @ itself, future-switching is reflexive
as well as symmetric.
Definition (Future). A sentence φ is Future iff it is g-breakable.
Corollary (Limited Past/Future Barrier). If Γ is non-Future and φ is Future,
then Γ 2 φ unless all future-switches of all models of Γ are models of φ.
Proof. This follows from the Limited General Barrier.
We can now see what the consequences of the barrier are for the instance of
(TM3): p  Fp.14 p is, as we wanted, non-Future, and Fp is, as we also
wanted, Future, and the argument is TML-valid. However it meets the barrier’s
unless clause: whenever p is true in a model, p will be true throughout the
14A small issue with potential to confuse: the (DM) and (TM) principles are stated in a very
general way using φ and we get instances of them by replacing φ uniformly with a sentence
of the language. The status of the resulting sentences as g-breakable or not can depend on
what we replace φ with. For example, using (TM3), p  Fp has a Future conclusion, but
(p∨¬p)  F (p∨¬p) does not. Strictly then, it is not the general principles themselves that
threaten to be counterexamples, but their instances.
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cells of the table, (at all pairs 〈t, w〉), so that no future-switching will result in a
model which makes Fp false. Given this, the argument is not a counterexample
to the Limited formulation of this barrier.
There’s another interesting proposed counterexample to the past/future bar-
rier. In the section headed “Correction of Hume on past and future” in chapter
3 of Prior (1967), we read:
J.F. Bennett recently described Leibniz as having discovered, and
Hume as having re-discovered, the principle that ‘if Q is an immedi-
ate consequence of P then there cannot be a time-reference in Q later
than the latest time-reference in P ’. One thing that the development
of tense-logic makes quite clear—if it was not clear before—is that
this alleged ‘discovery’ is in fact a falsehood. (Prior, 1967, 57))
A slight variant on Prior’s counterexample will play the same role for us here:
p  FPp
Here FPp is indeed a Future sentence on our taxonomy. For suppose it is true
in a model where p is false now and at all past times in the actual world, e.g.
the model on the left below.
w @ u
t5 q r r
t4 q p r
n q q r
t2 q q r
t1 q q r
w @ u
t5 q r r
t4 q r p
n q q r
t2 q q r
t1 q q r
Figure 5: A future-switch that breaks FPp
FPp is true in the model on the left because there is a time later than n (namely
t5) in the actual world when Pp is true. But the model on the right is a future-
switch of the model on the left and FPp is false there, hence the sentence is
g-breakable. Moreover, the premise p in the argument is non-Future, since
changing what happens at future-times does not change which atomic sentences
are true at 〈n,@〉. But the argument meets the barrier’s unless clause: for
suppose p is true at 〈n,@〉 in a model. No future-switch of that model makes
the sentence FPp false, again because future-switching does not change the
value of atomic sentences at 〈n,@〉.
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Normative sentences and Norm-shifting
We come at last to the most controversial of our five barriers: Hume’s Law.
What is it for a sentence to be normative? One idea—present in (Humberstone,
2019)’s survey of logical work on Hume’s Law and attributed there to (Karmo,
1988)—is that sentences are normative if their truth-value is somehow depen-
dent upon, and hence sensitive to, the normative standards. If so we might
expect normative sentences to be the ones that are breakable with changes in
the normative standards. But what does that mean? To refine the idea, we
introduce a simple deontic logic, though since it will be important to diagnose
the counterexample based on ought implies can from section 1.1, it will be a
Deontic Modal Logic (so not simple in one respect) which we will call DML.
The primitive expressions of DML are sentence letters, the deontic operators




1. W is a non-empty set of points (worlds),
2. S is a non-empty subset of W (the superb worlds)15
3. @ is an element of W (the model’s ‘actual world’)
4. I is an interpretation function mapping pairs of sentence letters and mem-
bers of W into the set of values {1, 0}.
The modal operators range over all of W , and the deontic operators O and P
are interpreted as quantifying over the set of superb worlds:
VM (Oφ,w) = 1 iff for all u ∈ S, VM (φ, u) = 1.
VM (Pφ,w) = 1 iff for some u ∈ S, VM (φ, u) = 1.
Truth in a model:
VM (φ) = 1 iff VM (φ,@) = 1
Logical consequence:
Γ DML φ iff for all models M, if VM (Γ) = 1, then VM (φ) = 1.
This gives us a logic which validates each of the DM-principles from section
1.1, including ought implies can and Mavrodes’ counterexample. For example:
Proposition 3. (DM3): φ  Pφ
Proof. Suppose VM (φ) = 1. Then VM (φ,@) = 1, and for all w ∈ W ,
VM (φ,w) = 1. Since S must be non-empty there is u ∈ S, and since S ⊆ W ,
VM (φ, u) = 1. Hence VM (Pφ,@) = 1 and VM (Pφ) = 1.
15S is a subset of W , rather than a binary relation like the relations S of our discussion
of B, S4 and S5, but one option is to regard it as a degenerate accessibility relation holding
between x, y ∈W just in case y is one of the superb worlds.
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Our R-relation will be S-shifting, where one DML-model is an S-shift of another
iff it is the same except (possibly) for the identity of the set of superb worlds,
S, which may be a different (non-empty) subset of W . More formally:
Definition (S-shifting). Where M and N are DML models, N is an S-shift of
M just in case:
1. WM = WN
2. @M = @N
3. for all sentence letters α, and w ∈W

















Figure 6: An example of S-shifting: on the left S = {w1, w2} (S is represented
by the light grey area) whereas on the right S = {w2, w4}.
Definition (Normative). A sentence φ is Normative iff it is S-shift-breakable.
Remark. Normative sentences include: Pp, Op, P¬p, O¬p, as well as the
result of putting any logically synthetic sentence composed of sentence letters
and truth-functors within the scope of an O or P .
A model with some p-worlds (worlds where p is true) and some non-p-worlds,
where O¬p is true, can be S-shifted to a model where O¬p is false by letting S
be the set of p-worlds. Similarly, if P¬p is true in a model with some p-worlds,
it can be made false by changing S to be the model’s set of p-worlds.
A logically synthetic sentence is one that is neither logically true nor unsat-
isfiable. If a truth-functional matrix is synthetic, it can be true at some worlds
and false at others. In models where S is the set of worlds where it is true,
placing the truth-functional matrix within the scope of a P or O results in a
sentence which is true in the model. Switching S to be the set of worlds where
the matrix is false then results in a model where the O and P sentences are
false. Hence such sentences are S-shift breakable.
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Remark. ¬Op and ¬Pp are normative. More generally, the class of normative
sentences is closed under negation.
This follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that S-shifting is symmetric.
Corollary (Limited Normative Barrier). If Γ is non-normative and φ is nor-
mative, then Γ 2 φ, unless all S-shifts of all models of Γ are also models of
φ.
Proof. This follows from the Limited General Barrier.
4 Analysis of Counterexamples
In this section we look at what to say—in the light of the barriers above—in
response to formal counterexamples proposed to Hume’s Law.
4.0.1 q  Op ∨ ¬Op; q  Op→ Pp; q  Pp ∨ P¬p
Arguments with logical truths on the right are valid, even if they have a de-
scriptive sentence on the left. Where the logical truth contains an O or a P , the
conclusion might seem normative, and so a counterexample to Hume’s Law.
However, on our taxonomy normativity is not a matter of containing an O
or a P , but of having a truth-value that is vulnerable to changes in the norms:
being S-shift breakable. No logical truth is S-shift breakable, since it is true in
all models. So the sentences on the right are not normative, and the arguments
are not counterexamples.
4.0.2 p,¬p, Oq
Arguments with unsatisfiable premises are valid, even if they have normative
conclusions. Unsatisfiable premises are also trivially descriptive on our defini-
tion: they are not S-shift breakable because they have no models at all.
However, arguments with unsatisfiable premises also meet the unless-
condition trivially: any model of the premises is such that all its S-shifts are
models of the conclusion. So they are not counterexamples.
4.0.3 p  p ∨Oq
This is a formalisation of the first part of Prior (1960)’s famous argument against
Hume’s Law. It has a descriptive premise and the conclusion is normative on
our taxonomy: p∨Oq is true in a model where p is false and Oq true, but false
in an S-shift of that model that makes Oq false. Hence it is S-shift breakable.
However, the argument meets the barrier’s unless clause: any model of the
premise p has no S-shift that makes p false and so no S-shifts that make p∨Oq
false. So this is not a counterexample. The argument with the equivalent
conditional, p  ¬p→ Oq, receives a similar analysis.
24
4.0.4 p ∨Oq,¬p  Oq
This is a formalisation of the second part of Prior’s argument. It is valid and
the conclusion is normative. But the premise set is normative too. Suppose
p ∨ Oq and ¬p are both true in a model where ¬q is also true. Then p is false
at @, and Oq is true at @. So q is true at all w ∈ S. But now shift S to include
the actual world, where q is false. Oq is not true in this S-shift of the original
model, and p is still not true, so p∨Oq is false and the premise set is no longer
satisfied. Hence it is normative, and the argument is not a counterexample.
4.0.5 ¬♦p  ¬Op
Finally we come to (DM2), the formal version of Mavrodes’ counterexample.
First, ¬♦p is non-normative; S-shifting does not change the modal accessibility
of any worlds (or which worlds exist), and so if ¬♦p is true in a model it is true
in all S-shifts of it. So it is not S-shift-breakable. Moreover, the argument is
valid in DML—we designed the logic so that it would be so that we could face
this kind of counterexample—and the conclusion is normative; Op is normative
and the set of normative sentences is closed under negation on our definition,
because S-shifting is a symmetric relation.
However, as might be expected after looking at our analysis of (IL3) and
(TM3) in the cases of the other barriers, the argument meets the unless-clause:
all DML-models of ¬♦p are such that W contains no p worlds. That means that
no amount of S-shifting can result in a model where S contains a p-world, and
so as model that makes ¬Op false. So the argument is not a counterexample.
5 Comparison with Extant Views
This section highlights some differences between the present paper’s account and
three other published proofs of Hume’s Law, due to Schurz (1991, 1997, 2010b),
Restall and Russell (2010), and Pigden (1989). The sketch of each view here is
of necessity brief, but each is published and the interested reader is referred to
the books and papers cited here for further details.
Schurz proves his Generalised Hume Thesis (GH) about a broad class of
deontic-modal-predicate logics. (GH) states that every deduction Γ ` A, where
the members of Γ are purely descriptive and the conclusion A is either purely
normative or mixed, is such that A is an O-irrelevant conclusion of Γ. His result
is, like ours, a limited one, and we might rephrase (GH): no purely normative or
mixed conclusion can be deduced from a set of sentences that is purely descrip-
tive unless that conclusion is an O-irrelevant conclusion of Γ. Schurz’ taxonomy
is characterised syntactically: Purely descriptive sentences are those containing
no occurrence of O. Purely normative ones are built up from elementary nor-
mative sentences with logical operators, and an elementary normative sentence
is one of the form Oφ. Sentences which are neither purely normative nor purely
descriptive—including disjunctions like p ∨Oq—are mixed.
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An advantage of the present model-theoretic approach over Schurz’ syntactic
approach to taxonomy is that we have no need to stipulate a list of normative
subsentential expressions, such as O; for us normativity is read off the sentence’s
truth-conditions, rather than its syntax. Schurz is open about his approach’s
need to assume a list of normative expressions: “in our logical framework we
must presuppose that under the primitive symbols we can separate those with
normative (or valuative) meanings. E.g. ‘it is necessary’, ‘it is desired’, etc.
have descriptive meaning, whereas ‘it is obligated’, ‘it is a value’ have ethical
meaning. Without this separation we would not even be able to formulate the is-
ought problem.” (Schurz, 1997, 9) Moreover he is not alone in making this kind
of assumption.16 Yet the need for the assumption is unfortunate, since whether
or not an expression counts as normative is often in dispute between defenders
of Hume’s Law and proposers of counterexamples. The present paper’s model-
theoretic approach allows us forgo it while retaining other virtues of Schurz’
view: the application to complex logics, and well-motivated “limits” on the
barriers.
The present view has one other advantage over the Schurz solution, and that
is that the account of Hume’s Law falls out of a unified account of the barriers:
universal, future, indexical, modal and, of course, normative. This strength is
shared with a different extant view, that of Restall and Russell (2010). However
the barrier proved here is different and an improvement on that earlier one in
three respects.
One important difference is that here we define the conclusion classes in
terms of R-breakabillity. In (Restall and Russell, 2010) they were defined in
terms of a stronger property: R-fragility, where a sentence φ is R-fragile just
in case any model of φ has at least one R-related model which is not a model
of φ. (This is stronger because a sentence might have some models which have
R-related models which make it false (R-breakability) without it being the case
that all its models have R-related models which make it false. (R-fragility).)
p∨Oq and p→ Pq are examples of sentences that are S-shift breakable without
being S-shift fragile.
The use of the stronger property permits Restall and Russell to prove an
unlimited version of their barrier, to do so without assuming a list of norma-
tive expressions, and to provide a unified account of the barriers.17 However,
Vranas (2010) and Schurz (2010a) were quick to point out the limitations of the
16See e.g. Prior and Jackson: “We follow Prior and adopt the common approach of defining
ethical statements as those containing ethical terms; where ethical terms are defined by a
technique of listing akin to that used in logic texts to specify the logical particles. That is,
the ethical terms are terms like “good,” “right,” “ought,” and so on.” (Jackson, 1971, 89–90)
17Two points of detail: the section of (Restall and Russell, 2010) on Hume’s Law failed
to retain the desired unity, but I think it could be regained with some minor refinements.
The paper also only dealt with 4 of the 5 barriers. The indexical barrier was taken up
by Russell (2011), but that later paper’s story is not quite in line with the treatment in
Restall and Russell (2010), characterising indexicality as sensitivity to context-shift and using
a syntactically specified limit clause. The use of the limit clause makes that 2011 paper in some
ways a bridge between Restall and Russell (2010) and the present paper, but the syntactic
limit clause is subject to the same criticisms as Schurz’ syntactic taxonomy.
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Restall and Russell account. Vranas notes that it classifies p∨Oq as neither de-
scriptive nor normative, and similarly for equivalent conditionals like ¬p→ Oq.
This means the barrier says nothing about whether such sentences follow from
descriptive premises. But the intuitive, informal barrier we are attempting to
capture does say something about them. Consider whether ¬p entails Oq. Of
course not, one might think—we would have to add something normative to ¬p,
to get something normative out. Something normative like: ¬p → Oq. So the
intuitive story about Hume’s law classifies ¬p → Oq and p ∨ Oq as normative.
The Restall and Russell (2010) account doesn’t do that, so it doesn’t say enough
to capture Hume’s Law.
Schurz (2010a) highlighted a different problem for Restall and Russell. Some
of the most interesting counterexamples to Hume’s Law use both deontic and
modal operators, including the one from Mavrodes (1964) that we discussed
in section 1. Restall and Russell (2010) proves its modal barrier for modal
logics and its deontic barrier for deontic logics, but it does not prove anything
about a deontic-modal logic strong enough to formulate the (DM) principles. It
thus fails to say anything about those complex counterexamples, and—argues
Schurz—cannot be extended to do so.
As we have already seen though, the present paper’s account avoids both of
those problems. By using breakability in place of fragility, p∨Oq and ¬p→ Oq
are properly classified as normative. And the ‘limit’ on the barrier allows it to
say the right thing about complex principles, such as the (DM), (TM), and (IL)
principles.
The third extant approach treats Hume’s Law as an instance of a differ-
ent general principle: the conservativeness of logic. Pigden (1989) argues that
not only do normative conclusions not follow from descriptive premises, but
(roughly) one cannot get anything in a conclusion that was not already in the
premises. He also endorses, for example, a hedgehog barrier: “conclusions con-
cerning hedgehogs cannot be logically derived from hedgehog-free premises.”
(Pigden, 1989, 132) The account makes exceptions for logical expressions—of
course one can derive ¬¬p from p—and for so-called vacuous appearances in the
conclusion—one can derive D ∨N from D, but since N could be replaced with
other sentence letters without rendering the argument invalid, the occurrence of
N is inessential to the argument’s validity, and so is vacuous. Both Hume’s Law
and what we might call Pigden’s Law (No hedgehogs in the conclusion unless
hedgehogs in the premises!) are taken to be instances of the following:
(CON) A predicate or propositional variable cannot occur non-vacuously in the
conclusion of a valid inference unless it appears among the premises.
where a predicate or propositional variable occurs vacuously in the conclusion
of an argument if can be replaced by any other expression of the same syntactic
type without rendering the argument invalid. (Pigden, 1989, 136)
Pigden’s view has a virtue that Schurz’ lacks: there is no need to agree a
list of normative expressions before we begin. Since the conservativeness thesis
applies as much to descriptive expressions like hedgehog as it does to normative
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ones like ought, the success of the project doesn’t depend on us drawing the
descriptive/normative line in any particular place.
However—as Pigden readily acknowledges—this raises a question: what
about normative logical expressions, like the P and O of deontic logic? They
give us arguments like p  Pp and q  Op → Pp. P is not vacuous on the
right of the first argument (you couldn’t replace it with an operator meaning it
is forbidden that, or it is impossible that) and neither Op nor Pp is vacuous in
the conclusion of the second.
Pidgen’s answer is that there are no such logical expressions. Logic proper
is limited to the logic of first-order quantifiers—classical or subclassical as that
may be. This restrictiveness on its own might be enough to discourage many
logicians, though the view has genuine and serious supporters in the Quinean
tradition. But even if there is some pure and strict sense of logic that applies
only to the first-order predicate calculus, logic in that restrictive sense hardly
seems to be the one in play in debates over Hume’s law. No-one would argue
that you can’t “get” ♦p from p in a similar way.
A final vice of the conservativeness approach is that it does not offer a unified
account of the barriers; the particular/universal barrier is not an instance of the
conservativeness of logic, unless perhaps we are prepared to reject the idea that
∀ is a logical expression.
6 Final Thoughts
Barriers like Hume’s Law are intuitive and accessible enough that we might
classify them as folk logic. Journalists, lawyers, and the protagonists of detective
novels all attest that “you can’t show that something doesn’t exist” and people
often find such claims plausible even before they embark on the formal study of
logic.
We can think of scientific logic as having shown that some such claims are
hyperbolic—an over-generalisation of a good insight. Sometimes we can show
that something doesn’t exist—using proof techniques like reductio, and reason-
ing about arbitrary objects. Even so, the insight that there is difficulty in
proving negative existentials is basically correct, even if it tends to be a bit
over-stated.
On the account given here, we can see, first, why the existence of the barriers
is so intuitive. The truth-value of the conclusion—universal, future, modally
universal, indexical, or normative—is vulnerable to changes that the truth-value
of the premise set is not similarly vulnerable to: domain extension, changes
in the future, additional possibilities, change in the context, or norm-shifting.
This leaves us with the sense that the conclusion could fail without the premises
failing.
So far, so good. But with more thought we see that there are special cases
in which the truth of the premises is sufficient to cut down the range of those
changes—e.g. which other futures are possible, what kinds of context are avail-
able, or what difference variation in norms could make—in such a way that
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the truth-value of the conclusion doesn’t vary over the reduced range. In such
cases the rough motivating argument for the barriers fails: you can get Rı from
∀xRx, Gp from p, and, yes ¬Op from ¬♦p, because e.g. if p is true, only
futures which satisfy Fp are on the cards; the variation which would allow a
counterexample has been excluded. Having recognised such exceptions, and the
way the motivating argument for the barriers fails for them, we can incorporate
them into the barriers via the unless clause. Since this meshes with the special
cases where the intuitive motivations fail, the result is not ad hoc, but rather a
natural and motivated limit on Hume’s Law and its fellow barriers.
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Castañeda, H.-N. (1968). On the logic of attributions of self-knowledge to others.
Journal of Philosophy, 65(15):439–456.
Fine, K. (2021). Truthmaking and the is-ought gap. Synthese, 198:887–914.
Flew, A. (1964). On not deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’. Analysis, 25(2):25–32.
Foot, P. (1958). Moral arguments. Mind, 67(268):502–513.
Geach, P. T. (1976). Murder and sodomy. Philosophy, 51(157):346–348.
Guevera, D. (2008). Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean
‘is-ought’ dictum. Synthese, 164:45–60.
Hare, R. M. (1991/1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press,
New York.
Humberstone, I. L. (1982). Necessary conclusions. Philosophical Studies, 41:321–
335.
Humberstone, I. L. (2019). Recent thought on Is and Ought : Connections,
confluences, and rediscoveries. Journal of Applied Logics, 6(7):1373–1446.
Hume, D. (1975/1748). Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and Con-
cerning the principles of morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford. edited by
L. A. Selby-Bigge.
Hume, D. (1978/1739). A treatise on Human Nature. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2nd edition.
29
Jackson, F. (1971). Defining the autonomy of ethics. The Philosophical Review,
83:88–96.
Jaggar, A. (1974). It does not matter whether we can derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 3(3):373–379.
Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, meta-
physics, and epistemology of demonstratives. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and
Wettstein, H., editors, Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, New
York.
Karmo, T. (1988). Some valid (but no sound) arguments trivially span the
‘is’-‘ought’ gap. Mind, 97(386):252–257.
Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Blackwell, Oxford.
Kurtzman, D. R. (1970). ‘Is’, ‘ought’ and the autonomy of ethics. Philosophical
Review, LXXIX:493–509.
Lewis, D. (1979). Attitudes de dicto and de se. The Philosophical Review,
88:513–543.
Lewis, D. (1997/1980). Index, context and content. In Papers in Philosophical
Logic, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, chapter 2, pages 21–44. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
MacIntyre, A. (1981). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Gerald Duck-
worth and Company Ltd., London, third edition.
Maitzen, S. (1998). Closing the ‘is’ - ‘ought’ gap. Canadian Journal of Philos-
ophy, 28(3):349–366.
Maitzen, S. (2010). Moral conclusions from non-moral premises. In Pigden, C.,
editor, Hume, Is and Ought: New Essays, pages 290–309. Palgrave MacMil-
lan.
Mavrodes, G. I. (1964). ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’. Analysis, 25(2):42–44.
Nelson, M. T. (1995). Is it always fallacious to derive values from facts? Argu-
mentation, 9:553–562.
Nelson, M. T. (2007). More bad news for the logical autonomy of ethics. Cana-
dian Journal of Philosophy, 37(2):203–216.
Notter, J. (2021). ‘Devoir implique pouvoir’ et le problème de negations des
normes. Philosophiques, 48(1):137–152.
Nowell-Smith, P. H. (1954). Ethics. Penguin Books, London.
Perry, J. (1977). Frege on demonstratives. The Philosophical Review, 86(4):474–
497.
30
Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs, 13:3–21.
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